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Abstract
Over the past 60 years, the U.S. financial sector has grown from 2.3% to 7.7% of GDP.
While the growth in the share of value added has been fairly linear, it hides a dramatic
change in the composition of skills and occupations. In the early 1980s, the financial
sector started paying higher wages and hiring more skilled individuals than the rest
of economy. These trends reflect a shift away from low-skill jobs and towards market-
oriented activities within the sector. Our evidence suggests that technological and
financial innovations both played a role in this transformation. We also document an
increase in relative wages, controlling for education, which partly reflects an increase in
unemployment risk: Finance jobs used to be safer than other jobs in the private sector,
but this is not longer the case.
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The financial sector in the U.S. has grown steadily over the post-war period. In 1950, it
accounted for 2.3% of U.S. GDP, and 2.8% of aggregate employee compensation. In 2005,
both shares were 7.7%. These steady increases, however, hide a deep structural break, that
occurred in the early 1980s. Until then, and for more than three decades, the financial
sector had grown by hiring more employees. From the early 1980s onward, the value added
per employee increased much faster in the financial sector than in the rest of the economy,
while the number of employees remained flat or even declined.
Understanding the growth of the financial sector, and the changing composition of its
labor force, can shed light on several important economic issues. The first is the allocation
of talent in the economy. It is well understood that entrepreneurial talent is a key input
into the process leading to economic growth. Baumol (1990) argues that the allocation of
talent across occupations is more readily influenced by institutions and economic incentives
than the overall supply of talent. Economic growth requires the allocation of talent to
socially productive activities. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) make a similar point,
and also discuss the role of increasing returns to ability in determining the careers of talented
individuals.
Both Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) argue that the flow of
talented individuals into law and financial services might not be entirely desirable, because
social returns might be higher in other occupations, even though private returns are not.
Yet, there is little systematic evidence on changes in the flows of talent over time. Even if
the potential for the diversion of talent exists, it does not matter if the diversion does not
actually take place, or only on a small scale. Our paper sheds light on this issue.
Our work also contributes to the understanding of the much debated issue of skill biased
technological change and income inequality. Katz and Murphy (1992) study the secular
growth in the demand for more-educated workers from 1963 to 1987, while Autor, Katz, and
Krueger (1998), Acemoglu (1998) and Card and Lemieux (2001), among others, discuss the
role of technological improvements biased in favor of skilled workers. The finance industry
has benefited greatly from innovation in computers and information technologies. We should
therefore expect to see large changes in the relative productivities of its employees.
While computers are general purpose technologies, there have been a number of financial
innovations since the 1960s. Silber (1983) reviews new financial products and practices be-
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tween 1970 and 1982. Miller (1986), reflecting upon the financial innovations that occurred
from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, argues that the development of financial futures was
the most significant one. Tufano (2004) argues that the more recent decades have witnessed
equally important innovations. These innovations and the development of new markets
probably changed the demand for skills in the financial sector. Moreover, they probably
increased the span over which individuals can apply their skills, making the financial sec-
tor more attractive to highly talented individuals, as emphasized by Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1991).
Finally, we contribute to the large literature on economic growth and structural change,
with the well-known contributions of Stigler (1956), Kuznets (1957) and Baumol (1967).
The rise in the finance industry is in some ways similar to the rise in other skill-intensive
services, studied recently by Buera and Kaboski (2006), but the financial sector plays a
particular role and needs to be analyzed separately. In a complete market, Arrow-Debreu
economy, there would be no financial sector. The complete market is the benchmark for
most economic applications. Studying the use of human capital in the financial sector might
inform us about the most important departures from the complete market model.
In this paper, we provide evidence on the transformation of the financial industry by
looking at the occupations, education and wages of its workforce. Was there a general
increase in the average education of the workforce entering the industry? Did some low skill
occupations disappear? Which occupations expanded? To answer these and other questions,
we turn to the Current Population Survey. Although this survey has been extensively used
to study the U.S. labor market at large, to the best of our best knowledge it has not been
utilized to study the financial sector in particular.
Our analysis uses a long time series and a representative sample of U.S. population.
This sample, however, is not appropriate for the study of very high incomes, which is the
focus of recent work by Kaplan and Rauh (2007).
We find that until the late 1970s, workers in the financial sector were only slightly more
educated and received slightly higher wages than in the rest of the economy. Since the early
1980s, however, the financial sector has been hiring more and more skilled individuals, at
a higher rate than the rest of the private sector. The increase in the skill intensity of the
finance labor force reflects both a composition shift away from the Banking industry and
3
towards investment banks, mutual, pension and private equity funds, which are relatively
more skill intensive, and an increase in skill intensity within some industries. Along with
the rise in skills, we document an increase in the wages paid to workers in the financial
sector, which is partly due to a relative increase in unemployment risk. Finally, we analyze
the changes in the set of tasks performed by workers in the financial sector.
Section 1 describes the growth of the financial sector, as well as three industries within
the industry. Section 2 considers the role of education in explaining the rise of wages paid
to employees in the financial sector. Section 3 studies the evolution of residual wages,
controlling for education, and the role of unemployment risk. Section 4 concludes. A
detailed description of the data can be found in the appendix.
1 The growth of the financial sector
In this section, we present broad trends for the U.S. financial sector over the post-war
period. We consider first the industry as a whole, using data from the Annual Industry
Accounts of the United States, and then three industries within the industry, using the
March supplement of the Current Population Survey. The data are described in details in
the appendix.
1.1 Trends for the sector
We start from the Annual Industry Accounts of the United States, published by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. We consider three measures of the size of an industry: value added,
compensation of employees, and employment. Value added is the contribution of the indus-
try’s labor and capital to the overall gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. We also
compute the compensation share. Compensation includes wage and salary accruals, as well
as supplements to wages and salaries. The compensation share and the value added share
of an industry can differ if the share of labor in the value added of the industry is not equal
to the labor share in the rest of the economy. For employment, we use the series Full-Time
and Part-Time Employees (FTPT) because it is consistently defined over the whole post-
war period. This measure simply counts the number of employees in the industry without
adjusting for the number of hours worked.1
1The full-time equivalent series (FTE) is available only from 1998 onward.
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Figure 1 shows that, in terms of valued added and compensation of employees, the
share of the financial sector has grown fairly linearly over the post-war period. However,
the pattern for the employment share is markedly different. The employment share of the
financial sector grows just like the value-added share until the early 1980s, but it then
flattens out and even declines somewhat after 1987.
The growth of the financial sector can therefore be decomposed into two distinct periods:
• From 1947 to 1977, the share of value added of the financial sector increased from
2.32% to 4.55%, an increase of 2.23 percentage points over 30 years. The share in the
compensation of employees increases from 2.72% to 4.36%. During this period, the
financial sector grows mostly by hiring more employees. The share of employment
increases from 2.39% to 3.86%, and the compensation per employee grows like in the
rest of the economy.
• From the 1980s onward, the financial sector grows by increasing the value added and
compensation of its employees faster than in the rest of the economy. The employment
share remains roughly constant, increasing to a maximum of 4.64% in 1987, and then
falls to 4.32% in the early 2000s. The value added share increases from 4.55% in 1977
to 7.69% in 2005, an increase of 3.14 percentage points over 28 years, faster than in
the previous period.
1.2 Trends for industries
We now turn to the March supplement of the Current Population Survey. The Current
Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of over 50,000 households conducted by the
Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In this section, and in the rest of
the paper, we focus on the private sector: we exclude all government employees, as well as
employees of the United States Postal Services. There are two reasons for doing so. The
first is to check that the trends identified earlier also hold for the share of finance within
the private sector. The second, more important reason is that the private sector is a better
control group than the whole economy, in particular when we think about unemployment
risk.
In the previous section, we treated financial sector as one large homogenous sector. One
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might wonder, however, whether the trends that we have described are the same in all
industries. We define three industries within the financial sector: “Banking and Saving”,
“Insurance” and “Other Finance Industries”. Banks, thrift and saving institutions are in-
cluded in “Banking and Saving”. Securities, commodities, funds, trusts, and other financial
establishments, as well as investment banks are all included in “Other Finance Industries”.
The top panel of Table 1 explains the classification, and Table 2 contains the number of
observations and the shares of employment of each industry on a full-time equivalent basis,
computed with the Census weighting scheme to obtain a sample representative of the U.S.
economy. Note that these are shares in the private sector, and therefore they add up to
more than the share presented in Figure 1. The trends, however, are consistent with those
from the Industry Accounts. In the CPS, the employment share of finance increases until
the early 1980s and remains constant afterwards. The wage-bill share increases linearly
throughout the 1970-2005 period, just like the value added share described above.
The left panel of Figure 2 shows the size of each industry in terms of hours worked.
The share of the Insurance sector is remarkably stable, at 2% of total hours worked. The
share of Banking increases from 2% in 1970 to 3% in 1988, and then decreases to 2.75%
in 2006. By contrast, the share of Other Finance Industries was constant until 1980 at
around 0.3% before increasing to 0.9% in 2006. The right panel of Figure 2 shows the size
of each industry in terms of its wage bill. Interestingly, the wage-bill share of Other Finance
Industries increased by more than twice as much as its share of hours worked. There are
smaller differences between the (increase in) wage-bill and (flat) hour share in the other two
industries. The financial sector accounted for 4.875% of private labor income in 1967 and
8.127% in 2005, an increase of 3.252 percentage points. Other Finance Industries increased
by 1.68 percentage points, from 0.62% to 2.3%, so it accounts for slightly more than half of
the overall increase of the industry.
Result 1
Over the post war period, the financial sector grew first by hiring more employees, and later
by increasing the value added of its employees. Wages in finance increased much faster than
in the rest of the economy from the late 1970s onward. The composition of the sector has
shifted away from Banking and towards Other Finance Industries.
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An increase in the relative wage can reflect various economic forces. In the short run,
because of search costs and industry specific human capital, the supply of labor is not
perfectly elastic across industries. Thus, an increase in demand or in productivity can lead
to an increase in relative wages, holding constant the composition of the labor force. In
the long run, however, the relative labor supplies adjust and differences in wages reflect
differences in human capital and in the disutility from work in different occupations. Our
next step is therefore to investigate the education of employees in the finance industry.
2 Education of the workforce
In this section, we investigate whether the evidence in Figures 1 and 2 reflect a shift in the
composition of the labor force of the financial sector around 1980. Our CPS data cover
the period 1967-2005. Over this period, the average education of the U.S. workforce has
increased substantially. We investigate whether the improvement in education has been
relatively faster or slower in the financial sector.
2.1 Wages and education
Given that value added per employee started to increase relatively faster in the financial
sector after 1980, it is natural to study the skill composition of the labor force. To do so, we
break down hours worked between employees with less than a college degree and employees
with at least a college degree. Let hi,s,t be hours worked by employee i in sector s at time t,
and let ei,t be a dummy variable for having at least a college degree. We define the college
graduate share of hours worked in sector s at time t as:
xs,t =
P
i
hi,s,t ωi,t ei,tP
i
hi,s,t ωi,t
, (1)
where ωist is the CPS sampling weight for that observation. The relative education of the
workforce of the financial sector is defined as the college graduate hour-share in Finance
and Insurance (s ≡ fin) minus the college graduate hour-share in the rest of the private
sector (s ≡ rop): xfin,t − xrop,t. We also construct the average hourly wage in each sector
ws,t, and we define the relative wage as the percentage difference in average hourly wages:
(wfin,t − wrop,t) /wrop,t.2 Figure 3 shows the evolution of the relative wage and the relative
2Average wages are weighted averages, using CPS weights.
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education over time. The two series display some striking similarities. Both are flat until
1980 and rise linearly afterwards, which suggests that part of the observed increase in
relative wages comes from a relative increase in the skill composition of the labor force.
Until 1980, wages are 12.5% higher and the hour-share of college graduates is 2.5 percentage
points higher in finance than in the rest of the private sector. By 2005, wages are more
than 40% higher and the hour-share of college graduates is 17.5 percentage points higher.
Result 2
The education of employees in the financial sector increased faster than in the rest of the
economy after 1980.
Does education account for the entire increase in relative wages? If wages are equalized
across sectors for a given level of education, the percentage difference in average hourly
wages should be equal to πt (xfin,t − xrop,t) / (1 + πtxrop,t), where πt is the college premium
at time t, defined as the percentage difference in the hourly wages of workers with and
without a college degree. The hour-share of college graduates increased from 13% to 30%
in the private sector between 1967 and 2005, and from 18% to 47.5% in the financial sector.
The college premium — the percent difference between the wages of college graduate and
those without a college degree — is around 55% in the 1970s and reaches 94% by the end of
our sample.3
Given the college premium and the differences in the hour shares of college graduates,
we would have expected finance wages to be 2.6% higher than in the rest of the economy
in 1970, while in fact they were 12.5% higher. By 2005, we would have predicted a 12.83%
difference in wages, compared to the observed 40%. The discrepancy comes from the fact
that employees of the financial sector earn more than employees in other sectors with similar
levels of education, and that the gap has increased over time. We address this issue in section
3.
2.2 Skill intensity
We use a simple model of the demand for skill to organize our discussion of skill intensities.
Suppose that there are two skill levels, h and l, and that the production function of sector
3The increase in the college premium is well known in the literature. See Katz and Murphy (1992) for
instance.
8
s is:
ys = f
³
μ1/σs h
1−1/σ + (1− μs)1/σ l1−1/σ;Xs
´
, (2)
where Xs is a vector of industry characteristics, and h and l are hours worked by high
education and low education workers, respectively. This production function has a constant
elasticity of substitution between high and low skill labor, σ. Many models of macroeco-
nomic growth use production functions with constant values for σ. Let wh and wl be the
hourly wages for high and low education workers. Cost minimization of the wage bill for
any level of output in (2) implies that the relative demand for high skill labor must satisfy:4
hs
ls
=
μs
1− μs
µ
wh
wl
¶−σ
. (3)
In the benchmark case, where σ and wl/wh are the same across sectors, the relative skill
intensity hs/ls depends only on the relative parameters μs across different industries.5 In
particular, using (3) to compare finance versus the rest of the economy leads to:
hfin/lfin
hrop/lrop
=
μfin
1− μfin
1− μrop
μrop
. (4)
Figure 4 focuses on employees with a least a college degree. The left panel shows the
share of hours worked by employees with at least a college degree in each industry, computed
according to equation (1). For the total private sector, it increased from 13.2% in 1968 to
30.6% in 2006, with a sample average of 23%. This share, however, varies a lot across sectors.
The sample average is 53.8% for Other Finance Industries, 32% in Insurance companies,
and 26.3% in Banking. The trend increase in Insurance is the same as in the rest of the
private sector, but the trends are steeper in Banking and Other Finance Industries. The
share of college graduates in Banking was roughly the same as in the rest of the private
sector in the early 1970s (even slightly lower), but 10 percentage points higher in 2005.
The right panel of Figure 4 shows the evolution of the left-hand side of equation (4)
over time, using hours worked by college graduates as a measure of h. The series are
normalized to have a mean of one over the first five years, 1967 to 1971. Interestingly, the
4These relationships do not require perfect competition in the market for goods and services, since they
follow from cost minimization, and not from profit maximization. They do require that firms take wages as
given, however.
5Although wages grow faster in the financial sector, the relative wage of college graduates was not
markedly different from the rest of the private sector. See Figure 9.
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relative skill intensity of Insurance has remained roughly constant throughout the sample
period, consistent with the benchmark model and balanced growth. On the other hand, the
relative skill intensity in Banking and in Other Finance Industries has increased sharply.
The Banking sector was slightly less skill intensive than the rest of the economy in the early
1970s, but it became significantly more skill intensive over the 1980s. The Other Finance
Industries sector was already skill intensive and has become more so over time.
Result 3
The relative skill intensity of the Insurance industry has remained approximately constant.
In contrast, Banking and Other Finance Industries have become more skill-biased than the
rest of the economy after 1980.
So far, we have documented an increase in the skill intensity of the financial sector
relative to the rest of the economy, and a change in the allocation of the workforce within
the financial sector away from Banking and towards Other Finance Industries. These trends
presumably reflect changes in the set of tasks performed by workers in the financial sector,
a topic that we now discuss.
2.3 Occupations
Our classification of occupations attempts to group employees according to the tasks they
perform, irrespective of the industry in which they work. For instance, we classify all em-
ployees trading securities as traders, no matter whether they work in Banking, Insurance
or Other Finance Industries. We do the same for managers and for administrative work-
ers. Unfortunately, it is hard to find consistent definitions of occupations over time. The
appendix explains in details what we did, the constraints we faced and the reasons for our
choices. At the end of the day, we use six occupations, presented in the bottom panel of
Table 1. Table 3 contains the number of observations for each occupation and each year,
and the shares of each occupation in the total employment of the Finance and Insurance
sector.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the employment shares of four occupations: The two
largest on the left panel, and the two fastest growing on the right panel. The fraction of
clerks and workers employed in administrative tasks has declined dramatically over time.
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This is true in all industries, and it is particularly important in Banking. The decrease in
the share of clerks explains much of the evolution of average wages in Banking after 1980.
“Securities and Financial Asset Sales” and “Computer and Mathematics” are the fastest
growing occupations.6 It is clear that the financial sector has become more trading-intensive
and more computer-intensive over time.
Result 4
Much of the skill bias in Banking reflects the decline of bank tellers and other administrative
occupations. The fastest growing occupations in finance are related to the trading of financial
assets, and the use of computers and mathematics.
2.4 Technological or financial innovations?
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2002) sort jobs and tasks along two dimensions: manual or
cognitive, routine or non-routine. Computers can perform routine tasks and are therefore
substitutes for labor employed in routine jobs. Computers are complements to non-routine
tasks, especially cognitive ones, and they are neither complements nor substitutes to manual
non-routine tasks. As a result, employees in abstract or analytical tasks become more
productive, the demand for routine jobs decreases, while manual jobs are less affected.
The evolutions of the tasks performed by the financial sector provide support for the
idea that advances in information technology, and in particular the decrease in the price of
computing power, have considerably decreased the demand for routine jobs and increased
the productivity of non-routine abstract jobs.
The relative stability of Insurance, however, suggests that financial innovations might
also have played a role. Insurance was already a skill intensive industry in 1980, yet its
evolution does not suggest a strong skill bias afterwards. Moreover, one might think that
improvements in computers by themselves affected the insurance sector as much as the other
financial sectors.
It seems likely that financial innovations also played an important role. Indeed, among
the 38 new financial products and practices introduced between 1970 and 1982 listed in
6One should keep in mind that, as shown in Table 2, there are few observations in these occupations at
the beginning of the sample, which explains the initial volatility of the series.
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Silber (1983), only 2 or 3 are related to Insurance. These innovations had a larger impact
on Other Finance Industries than on the Insurance industry. Many of these innovations are
market-oriented, which explains the nature of the fastest growing occupations in Figure 5.
This is also consistent with the argument in Miller (1986) on the importance of financial
futures markets.
3 Wage premia in the financial sector
To what extent can education account for the change in relative wages that we have doc-
umented? In this section, we document that even controlling for education, finance wages
have increased faster than in the rest of the economy, and then we show that this might
partly reflect an increase in unemployment risk. To make the discussion more concrete, we
start by considering the striking example of engineers.
3.1 Financiers and engineers
In this section, we focus on a particular comparison, that between engineers and financiers
with similar levels of education. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the average annual wages
of employees in the Finance and Insurance sector with a college degree or more, and of
engineers employed in the private sector (but not in Finance and Insurance). The wages
are in constant 2000 prices. The left panel uses individuals with exactly a college degree,
and the right panel uses employees with a post-graduate degree. In both cases, the relative
wage of finance employees was constant until the 1980s, and then started to increase faster
than the wage of engineers with the same level of education. The picture is particularly
striking for post-graduates, a category that includes MBAs and PhD graduates.
Moreover, the CPS underestimates the income of individuals who earn very high salaries,
due to top-coding of income. Therefore, the wages that we report may not be accurate for
certain occupations, Securities and Financial Asset Sales in particular. In our sample, the
percent of top-coded observations in the private sector is around 1%, but it is around 2%
in Banking, 2.5% in Insurance and up to 13% in Other Finance Industries. We have tried
to correct the induced biases, as explained in the appendix, but it is not possible to remove
them entirely. See Kaplan and Rauh (2007) for a detailed analysis of the highest incomes
inside and outside finance.
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3.2 Wage regressions
We have seen that the wages of employees in the financial sector have increased relative
to the rest of the private sector. This increase has been accompanied by an increase in
the share of college graduates working in the financial sector. The first question we seek
to answer is whether the change in the composition of the labor force, in particular its
education, can account for all of the observed increase in wages.
To answer this first question, we run a series of cross-sectional regressions on sub-
samples of five years.7 Pooling the data ensures that we have enough observations in each
cell. We restrict our attention to full time employees of the private sector, i.e., employees
who work at least 40 weeks a year, and at least 35 hours a week.8 For each subsample
τ ∈ {[1967, 1970] , ... [2001, 2005]}, we run the following regression:
log (wit) = αt,τ + βτ ·Xi,t + γτ · edui,t + φτ1φit + uit, (5)
where t ∈ τ . In equation (5), wit are the annual wage earnings of individual i in year
t, Xit are individual characteristics of individual i at time t (race, sex, marital status,
urban residence, potential experience and its square), and eduit is a vector of dummies for
education groups: 12 years of education, 13 to 15 years, 16 to 17 years, and 18 years or
more. The variable 1φit is a dummy, equal to one if individual i works in the financial sector
in year t. Within each period we also control for year effects αt,τ . We allow the vector of
coefficients γτ to vary over periods in order to capture changes in the returns to education
common to all sectors in the economy. The coefficient φτ measures the extent to which
every finance employee receives a higher wage, controlling for all other things. It captures
compensating wage differentials or unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 4 displays the results of the regressions (5). The most striking feature of the data
is the increase in the returns to education, especially for high education. Mincer (1997),
Lemieux (2006) and Deschênes (2006) show that log wages have become an increasingly
convex function of the years of education since the 1970s, and Autor, Katz, and Kearney
(2006) argue that the U.S. labor market has become more polarized since 1980. Indeed, one
can see in Table 3 that the gap between high-school graduates and college-educated workers
7The first regression uses the first four years of data, from 1967 to 1970.
8Our sample excludes individuals that earned less than 80% of the federal minimum hourly wage.
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has increased dramatically, while the gap between high-school graduates and dropouts has
increased only moderately. Controlling for education is important if one wants to understand
the evolution of the wages of workers in the financial sector.
Figure 7 plots the evolution of φτ from two specifications of equation (5), one where we
exclude education (not reported here) and one where we include education, which corre-
sponds to the first row of Table 4. The drop from one line to the other shows that education
accounts for six to eight percentage points of the difference in log wages. However, even
controlling for education, we find that individuals working in the Finance and Insurance
sector earn more than individuals working in the Rest of the Private Sector. The ‘finance
premium’ was small, around 3.4% until the mid-seventies. It started to grow in the late
1970s, to reach 20% in the early 2000s. To better understand the ‘finance premium’, we
decompose it into three premia, one for each of our industries. Figure 8 shows that the wage
differentials have increased in all three industries. In Banking, there is no wage differential
in the early 1980s. The wage differential is much larger in Other Finance Industries, which
is the more skill intensive sector. Moreover, in this industry it increases the most, by more
than 20 percentage points. However, since we control for observed skill, this is indeed a
premium for working in the sector.
Our previous specification implicitly assumed that wage differentials were the same for
all education groups. We now relax this assumption and run the following regression:
log (wit) = αt,τ + βτ ·Xi,t + γτ · edui,t +
³
φτ + γ
φ
τ · edui,t
´
1φit + uit.
The vector of coefficients γφτ measures the additional return to education in the financial
sector. Table 5 displays the results of the regressions and Figure 9 plots the evolution of the
wage earnings of college and high school graduates inside and outside finance. Within each
education group, the wage differential is small in the 1970s and starts to increase in the early
1980s. The wage regressions therefore confirm that a specific transformation took place in
the financial sector in the late 1970s and early 1980s — one that affected all education groups
and all industries within finance. In addition, the results show that the college premium
— the relative wage of college graduates to high school graduates — is roughly the same in
finance as in the rest of the private sector.
Result 5
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Controlling for the observed characteristics of employees, the relative wage in finance started
to increase in the late 1970s. A similar pattern emerges within each industry and within
each education group.
3.3 Wage differentials and unemployment risk
That two individual with the same education and observable characteristics earn such differ-
ent income can be explained in one of three ways: compensating differentials, employment
and wage risk, and unobserved heterogeneity. According to the first candidate explanation,
finance jobs are relatively less attractive than non-finance jobs, and, in equilibrium, this
is reflected in the relative wages. Compensating differentials are certainly important, and
they can account for a fraction of the average differences that we observe. However, they
do not strike us as a plausible explanation for the increase in the relative wages paid in the
financial sector, because it is hardly sensible to argue that finance jobs are less interesting
today than they were 30 years ago, especially relative to the rest of the private sector.
Another, and in our view more plausible, explanation for the trends in relative compen-
sation, is a relative increase in labor income risk in the financial sector. If finance workers
are more likely to loose their jobs, or if their wages are more volatile, they would have to
be compensated for this extra risk. To test this explanation, we fit two regressions. Let λit
be a dummy for being employed at time t. First, we run a logit regression on the likelihood
of becoming unemployed:
Pr (λit+1 = 0 | λit = 1) = f
³
1φit; wit; edui,t; Xi,t
´
(6)
where f is the logistic function.
The estimation of equation (6) requires a longitudinal dimension. Therefore we use the
Matched CPS, which allows us to potentially observe each individual in the CPS twice,
in two consecutive years. See the appendix for a complete description of the methodology
involved in matching observations on individuals from consecutive surveys.
We use a broad definition for unemployment. It includes not only the individuals who
are not employed and are looking for a job for the entire year, but also those that worked
part-year and were actively looking for a new job in some of the weeks not worked.9 Thus,
9See appendix for a more detailed definition.
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to be in the sample at time t, an individual must be in the labor force, and employed in
the private sector. At time t+ 1, the individual must be in the labor force (in the private
or public sectors), either employed or not. On average, over the whole sample, 6.91% of
individuals experience a transition from employment to unemployment. Individuals in the
financial sector are less likely to loose their jobs: only 4.39% make the transition. The
relative stability of finance jobs has decreased over time, however, as one can see in Table 6,
which reports our estimates for equation (6). As expected, full time, married, experienced
workers, and workers with a higher level of education, are less likely to become unemployed.
Figure 10 shows the evolution of unemployment risk in the financial sector relative to
the private sector. The probability of becoming unemployed is evaluated for the average
worker, i.e., it is evaluated at the means of all other variables. From the late 1970s to the
early 1990s, the stability of jobs in the financial sector has converged to the average for the
rest of the private sector. This convergence started in the early 1980s, which coincides with
the timing of the increase in relative wages in finance, as shown in Figure 2.
When we estimate equation (6) with separate dummies for the three industries, we find
clear trends in Banking and Insurance. In Other Finance Industries we do not observe
enough transitions to draw reliable conclusions. We have also estimated an equation with
wage risk, measured either by the volatility of the log wage, or by the probability of a drop
of more than 10%, on the left hand side. We did not find any evidence that wage risk is
higher in the financial sector, or that the relative risk has changed over time.
An important concern with our controls for education is that it might not capture
important heterogeneity among individuals with the same number of years of schooling.
A better way to capture this heterogeneity is to control for the current wage, rather than
education. To do so, we construct three wage groups with cutoffs at the 34th and 67th
percentiles of the overall wage distribution in a given year. Note that the cutoffs correspond
to the distribution of wages in the entire private sector, not the financial sector, because the
correct experiment is to compare individuals with the same wages inside and outside the
financial sector. Table 7 reports the results of the regression. Figure 11 shows the evolution
of the relative unemployment risk of jobs in the financial sector, broken down into these
three wage groups. Once again, we observe a clear upward trend in all groups.
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Result 6
Unemployment risk was lower in the financial sector than in the rest of the private sector
until 1980. It increased in relative terms over the 1980s and early 1990s.
A simple calibration
Based on the evidence presented so far, we can propose a first interpretation of the data.
Regarding the level of compensation, a constant compensating differential appears to be
required, since even in the more recent years, the unemployment risk in the finance industry
is not higher than in the rest of the economy. It has merely converged to the same level.
The increase in the relative unemployment risk in the financial sector can however account
for some of the increase in relative wages. Ruhm (1991) finds that layoffs lead to temporary
unemployment and long lasting decreases in earnings: “Displaced workers were out of work
eight weeks more than their observably similar counterparts in the year of the separation,
four additional weeks in period t+1, and two extra weeks at t+2. By year t+3 they were
jobless only 1.5 weeks more than the peer group, and the t+4 increase was just six days.”
By contrast, “almost none of the t+1 wage reduction dissipated with time. The earnings
gap remained at 13.8 percent and 13.7 percent, respectively, in years t +3 and t +4.”
A complete study of the effects of unemployment risk on the level of compensation that is
needed to keep workers indifferent between different jobs is clearly beyond the scope of this
paper. Nonetheless, we think it is useful to provide some simple benchmark calculations.
We do so in the simplest framework possible and we assume that labor income is the only
source of risk and that the utility function has constant relative risk aversion. We set the
personal discount rate and the market rate both equal to 3% per year. We assume that
workers live and work for 40 years, and that the labor income process, yt, is given by
yt+1 =
½
1.02 yt with probability 1− p
0.86 yt with probability p
¾
, and y1 given.
The increase of 2% captures the normal increase in real labor income. The drop by 14%
captures the income loss from displacement documented by Ruhm (1991). This process
implies that shocks are permanent, which makes the effect of unemployment risk more
important, so we are likely to obtain an upper bound for the impact on the relative wages.
We perform the following experiment. First, we set p = 4.41% and y1 = 1, we solve
and simulate the model with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equals to 2. We then
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increase the unemployment risk to p = 6.91%. This increase of 2.5 points corresponds to
the increase in relative unemployment risk that we have documented earlier. In order to
keep workers indifferent, the new starting wage should be y1 = 1.084, an increase of 8.4%.
If we lower the calibrated risk aversion to 1, the required increase in wages is 7.8%. If we
increase risk aversion to 3, the required increase in wages is 9%. Recall that the premium
paid to finance employees has increased by 16.6 points, from 3.4% to 20%. Thus, it appears
that the increase in unemployment risk could account for half of the increase in relative
wages.
4 Conclusion
Until the late 1970s, workers in the financial sector were only slightly more educated and
received slightly higher wages than in the rest of the economy. Since the early 1980s,
however, the financial sector has been hiring more and more skilled individuals. There has
been a composition shift away from Banking and towards relatively more skill intensive
industries. In addition, there has been an increase in skill intensity within Banking and
within Other Finance Industries.
Our results suggests two sources of skill bias: computers and market-related financial
innovations. First, there is clear evidence that jobs involving routine tasks have tended
to disappear, probably because of improvement in computers and information technologies.
This is especially true in Banking, where the trend may have been reinforced by deregulation
and consolidation. The relative stability of Insurance, however, as well as the fact that the
fastest growing tasks involve the trading of financial assets suggests that innovations in
financial markets also played an important role.
Controlling for education and observable characteristics, we find that employees of the
financial sector earned 3 to 4% more than employees in the rest of the private sector during
the 1970s. At that time, however, they also enjoyed substantially lower unemployment
risk. After 1980, the unemployment risk in the financial sector started to catch up with
unemployment risk in the rest of the private sector. Over the same period, the finance
wage premium (controlling for education and observable characteristics) increased to 20%.
A simple calibration suggests that the increase in relative unemployment risk could account
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for one half of the increase in the finance wage premium. The remaining half probably
reflects unobserved heterogeneity in the labor force.
Overall, the share of talented individuals hired by the financial sector has increased
very significantly over the past three decades. This finding raises several questions for
future research. First, does the increase in skilled labor in the financial sector lead to
more innovations in this sector? Second, how do financial innovations affect the rest of
the economy? Finally, what are the welfare consequences of the shift in the allocation of
talent?10
10Philippon (2007) discusses the optimal allocation of talent in a model with credit constraints and indus-
trial innovations, but no financial innovations.
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Appendix
A Description of the data
A.1 Annual industrial accounts
We obtain data on employment and value added at the industry level from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). Value added, the contribution of each industry’s labor and
capital to the overall gross domestic product (GDP), is equal to an industry’s gross output
(Sales or receipts and other operating income, commodity taxes, and inventory change)
minus its intermediate inputs (consumption of goods and services purchased from other
industries or imported). Current-dollar value added by industry is calculated as the sum
of disbursements to its labor and capital which are derived from the components of gross
domestic income.
Employment could be defined in a number of ways: all employees, full-time equivalent,
or total hours worked. There is, however a compatibility issue around 1997, when the BEA
changed its industry classification from SIC to NAICS. As a result, only the series for the
number of ‘full time and part time employees’ (FTPT) is available consistently, and this is
the one that we use. The 1948-97 full-time and part-time employees was released in Octo-
ber 2006, by the Industry Economic Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S.
Department of Commerce. Because this series is based on the current NAICS classification,
it is possible to link the 1948-1997 and 1998-2005 samples.
A.2 The Current Population Survey
Our data on individuals comes from the March supplement of the Current Population Sur-
vey (Annual Social and Economic Study) from survey years 1968-2006, which pertain to
1967-2005 actual years. A CPS year refers to data of the preceding year, i.e. March CPS
2006 documents annual data from calendar year 2005. We therefore adopt the following
taxonomy: We call “year” the actual year that the survey pertains to, while a CPS year is
denoted as “survey year”. The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of
about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.11 Currently, there are more than 65,000 participating households. The sample is
selected to represent the civilian non-institutional U.S. population. The CPS includes data
on employment, unemployment, earnings, hours of work, and other demographic character-
istics including age, sex, race, marital status, and educational attainment. Also available
are data on occupation, industry, and class of worker. We choose to use only one particular
month survey, the March supplement, for two reasons. First, this supplement contains more
demographic details, in particular on work experience and income sources and amounts.
Since 1976, the survey has also been supplemented with a sample of Hispanic households
(about 2,500 interviewed). Second, it has been extensively used in the empirical labor and
macro-labor literature, which lends to the comparability of our results. Let us now define
the groups that we use in our empirical analysis. We restrict attention to individuals who
are in the labor force, of at least 15 years of age.
Industry Classification
We define three industries within the private sector: “Banking and Saving”, “Other Finance
Industries”, and “Insurance”. To define the private sector, we exclude all government
employees, as well as employees of the United States Postal Services. Banks, thrift and
saving institutions are included in “Banking and Saving”. Securities, commodities, funds,
11We obtained the data from Unicon Research, http://www.unicon.com/
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trusts, and other financial investments as well as investment banks are all included in “Other
Finance Industries”. Table 2 shows the number of observations of employees surveyed from
the three financial industries and from the rest of the private sector from 1968 to 2006.
Table 2 also shows the shares of employment, computed with the Census weighting scheme
to obtain a sample representative of the U.S. economy. These sectors are consistently
identified, without any "jumps" or "drops" in their shares of total employment, despite
changes in industrial classifications in the CPS in our sample, which occur following each
decennial census. The major industrial re-classifications occurred in survey year 1983, from
the Census 1970 system to the 1980 system; and in survey year 2003, from the Census 1990
system to the 2000 system. Of these two re-classifications, the latter was more substantial
overall, yet it does not affect our sectors. The Census Bureau provides industrial crosswalks
for the 1970-1980 systems and for the 1990-2000 systems, from which one can gauge how
some industries are split or merged into others (Census Bureau (1989), Census Bureau
(2003)). These crosswalks are basically a transition matrix for all industries from one
classification to the other. A close examination of these transition "probabilities" lead us
to conclude that our industries are consistently defined throughout our sample. In the
transition from the 1970 system to the 1980 system 99.9% remain inside each industry; and
for the transition from the 1990 system to the 2000 system over 95% of workers remain
inside each industry. This is due to the fact that the functions of our three industries are
narrowly and well defined, and due to the fact that they are not too large.
Occupations
Examining the distribution of occupations within our three industries lead us to choose
six occupation groups (henceforth, "occupations"), which describe the major occupational
groups in our sample. These are: “Managers and Professionals”, “Computer and Mathe-
matics”, “Insurance Specialists”, “Securities and Financial Asset Sales”, “Administration,
Including Clerks”, and “All the Rest” (janitors, security and miscellaneous). As with indus-
try classifications, major occupational re-classifications occurred in survey year 1983, from
the Census 1970 system to the 1980 system, and in survey year 2003, from the Census 1990
system to the 2000 system. Of these two re-classifications, the latter was more substantial.
We examined the occupational crosswalks, which are provided by the Census Bureau to
make sure that our occupational groups are consistently defined over time (Census Bureau
(1989), Census Bureau (2003)). We could not consistently separate "managers" from "pro-
fessionals" due to re-classifications in survey years 1983 and 2003; some occupations that
were defined as "professional" were split and re-classified as "managerial" and vice versa.
However, these two groups together are consistently identified, without any "jumps" or
"drops" in their employment shares over time. Much effort was devoted to making sure
that the other occupation groups are also consistently defined throughout our sample. See
the appropriate appendix for a detailed description of occupation groups and how they
are constructed. Note that some of these occupations potentially mean different things in
different industries. For instance, in Banking the “Managers and Professionals” include
“bank officers”, but these officers do not exist in the two other industries. Another example
from Banking is that bank tellers are a significant part of the “Administration, Including
Clerks”, but, once again, they do not exist in other industries. However, our more narrowly
defined occupations, “Computer and Mathematics”, “Insurance Specialists” and “Securities
and Financial Asset Sales” are the same in all industries. Table 3 contains the number of
observations for each occupation and each year, and the shares of each occupation in the
total employment of the finance and Insurance sector, using the Census weights to obtain
a representative sample.
Education and experience
Until survey year 1991 years of education are reported in annual steps, starting with 0
years till 18 years (which also absorbs instances of more than 18 years). Also until survey
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year 1991 we correct years of schooling for individuals who did not complete the last year
in school by subtracting one year. This correction is not needed after survey year 1992.
From survey year 1992 and on early school attainment is lumped into groups: 0 years, 1-4
years, 5-6 year and 7-8 years. Also starting in survey year 1992 school attainment starting
with high school is marked by degrees, not years, therefore it is not possible to distinguish
between, e.g., 13, 14 and 15 years of school. To make our education variable consistent
throughout our sample, we adopt the coding that starts in survey year 1992, i.e., we group
early school attainment into brackets for all the sample and assign maximal values to each
bracket. Also, we group 13, 14 and 15 years of school together and assign 14 years for all
individuals within that bracket in all years. In addition, we lump 17 years of schooling
together with 16 years, for similar reasons. This makes the education variable categories
smooth throughout the sample, and in particular around the 1991-1992 surveys. In our
analysis we consider mainly two education categories: less than 4-year college graduates
(up to 15 years of school, including 2-year college graduates), and college graduates (16
years of school, including 4-year college graduates, and post-graduates). These groups are
sufficient to characterize differences in skill. In some cases where it is not, we separate
tertiary education into only college and post-graduate degrees. Experience is potential
labor market experience. It is measured as min(age-edu-6;age-18), where ‘edu’ is years of
schooling. The CPS does not contain data on job spells.
Annual hours worked
In order to compute annual hours worked we multiply the number of weeks worked by
average hours worked in a week. Weeks worked are grouped into 7 brackets before survey
year 1976. Therefore we impute the average number of weeks worked before survey year
1976 by calculating the average weeks worked within those brackets in later years, by sex
(male\female). By this we get a better estimate of typical number of weeks worked for each
sex in earlier years. Average hours worked per week are reported from survey year 1976 and
on, but not beforehand. Until survey year 1975 only hours last week are reported, so we use
those when available. For individuals who worked during the survey but where hours last
week are not reported we impute average hours worked by calculating the average hours
worked per week in later years by sex and full-time\part-time status (full-time means at
least 35 hours a week).
Wages and top-coding
We deflate all wages reported in the CPS using the deflator for personal consumption
expenditures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The reference year is 2000. Hourly
wages are calculated by dividing annual wage income by number of hours worked. The CPS
underestimates the income of individuals who earn very high salaries, due to top-coding of
income. Therefore, the wages that we report may not be accurate for certain occupations,
Securities and Financial Asset Sales in particular. In our sample, the percent of top-coded
observations in the private sector increases from 0.06% in 1967 to 1.1% in 1980, after which
it fluctuates in the range 0.38%-1.6%, due to secular adjustments of the top-coding income
limit. However, in the financial sector there are many more incidents of top-coding: in
Banking, there are on average twice as many top-coded observations, in Insurance there are
on average 2.4 as many top-coded observations, whereas in Other Finance Industries there
are on average 13 times as many top-coded observations. This leads to an under-estimation
of relative wages in the financial sector. In an attempt to compensate for this, we multiply
top-coded incomes in all survey years until 1995 by a factor of 1.75–which is higher than
the traditional factor of 1.4-1.5. From survey years 1996 and on, top-coded incomes are
average amounts of actual earnings for 12 socioeconomic cells; therefore we do not adjust
them.
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B Construction of occupation cells
In order to create meaningful, but not-too-small occupation cells, we first tabulated all oc-
cupations in each of the three industries, “Banking and Saving”, “Other Finance Industries”
and “Insurance” separately over time. Merging the industrial classifications for these three
industries over time was relatively straightforward, since changes in industrial classifications
over the years did not result in any significant re-allocation of workers in these sectors. See
description in the text above. The 2-digit occupation classifications did not contain enough
information on some occupations of interest, so the tabulation was done at the 3-digit level
(the most detailed available). Consistent classifications are available within the following
survey year intervals: 1968-71, 1972-82, 1983-2002, 2003-06. For 1968-71, the census 1960
classification was used, for 1972-82 the Census 1970 classification, for 1983-2002 the Census
1980 and 1990 classifications, and for 2003-06 the Census 2000 classification. Census 1980
and 1990 classifications are virtually identical, but there are significant re-allocations of
occupations between the 1970 and 1980 systems, and between the 1990 and 2000 systems.
Since the classifications change from time to time, much effort went into identifying the
relevant classifications across years. This was done by comparing high-frequency occupa-
tions from the tabulation with their headings from the CPS documentation. Then, using
the apparent occupation groups, time series of occupational shares within each industry
were graphed in order to make sure that the groups are consistent across time. Major re-
classifications occurred in survey year 1983 and in survey year 2003; in these cases we checked
the occupational crosswalks from the Census Bureau to make sure that our occupational
groups are consistently identified (Census Bureau (1989), Census Bureau (2003)). Finally,
we defined six occupation groups (henceforth, "occupations"), which concisely describe the
major occupational groups in our sample in a parsimonious way. These are: “Managers
and Professionals”, “Computer and Mathematics”, “Insurance Specialists”, “Securities and
Financial Asset Sales”, “Administration, Including Clerks”, and “All the Rest” (janitors,
security and miscellaneous). Some additional adjustments were done by comparing average
wages and education levels within 3-digit occupation cells to average wages in our occupa-
tional groups. This helped us understand better the nature of some occupational headings
and to hint towards where they belong within our occupational groups. In particular, this
led us to allocate "supervisor-of..." occupations in survey years 1983-2002 into "Managers
and Professionals", since their wages were similar to that group and an order of magnitude
higher than closely-labeled occupations. But we did not allocate "first-line supervisors" in
CPS 2003-06 into that group, as their wages did not conform to the previous rule.
Managers and Professionals
Managers are quite heterogeneous. They include chief officers, but also middle manage-
ment, operation managers, financial managers, human resources managers, etc.’. We found
a large range of variation within this group in terms of education. Management-related
occupations are part of the managerial occupation classifications in survey years 1983-2002,
but are mostly allocated to other occupations in the Census 2000 system and 1970 system.
Therefore we allocated managers with professionals in all years. A close examination of
the titles and wages of these occupations justifies this allocation. Professionals are also
quite heterogeneous in terms of occupation titles, but less so in terms of education lev-
els. The most prevalent occupations in this cell are economists, accountants, analysts and
lawyers. Before survey year 1983 bank officers (presumably, branch managers) are allocated
to the one classification that is relevant for management in this industry: “Bank officers
and financial managers”. But from 1983 bank managers are allocated to “professional”
classifications. This is evident from the heading of the managerial category that is relevant
for Banking from 1983 and from a sharp drop in the share of managers from 1981 to 1982
(data years), which is commensurate with an increase in the share of professionals. Bank
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officers cannot be separately identified before 1983–so we aggregated “managers” and “pro-
fessionals” together as one unit throughout the sample in order to keep a consistent group.
When keeping these two groups separate, the real wages of each group separately seem to
be consistent over time and do not exhibit any jumps due to the change in classification
systems aforementioned. In particular, wages of “professionals” do not jump upward after
1983, when bank officers are allocated to that group. Managers’ wages are somewhat higher
throughout, and start increasing more after 1985. But the wages of Managers and Profes-
sionals in Banking commove quite closely; this might reflect the relatively tight hierarchical
organizational structure in Banking.
Computer and Mathematics
This cell is quite homogeneous throughout. Much effort was put into making it consistent
through time. Despite significant variance in distribution across education categories, indi-
viduals in this cell earn relatively similar wages. This indicates that tasks\productivity in
this group do not vary much across education categories. The cell includes computer sci-
entists and systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, database admin-
istrators, network and computer systems administrators, etc.’. In addition, it also includes
mathematicians. The cell does not include actuaries and statisticians for the simple reason
that these two occupations appear almost only in Insurance and, therefore, are allocated to
the “professionals” cell.
Insurance Specialists
This cell includes only Insurance agents, adjusters, examiners, investigators and underwrit-
ers. Almost all observations in this cell come from the Insurance industry, but there is a
significant number of observations in Banking and Saving. “Insurance adjusters, examiners,
and investigators” were split from 2003 CPS into two categories (“Claims adjusters, apprais-
ers, examiners, and investigators” and “Insurance claims and policy processing clerks”). We
re-allocated them together to get a consistent group.
Securities and Financial Asset Sales
This cell includes stock, bond, commodity and other asset traders, and personal financial
advisors. Almost all observations in this cell come from the Other Finance Industries in-
dustry, but there is a significant–and growing– number of observations in the other two
industries. Before survey year 1971 (i.e., 1968-70) many individuals that would fit in “Secu-
rities and Financial Asset Sales” were actually allocated to broad managerial classifications
and cannot be separated.
Administration, Including Clerks
This cell is probably the most diverse in terms of education levels and wages. It contains
a large range of different occupations that operate in offices, like tellers, clerks, secretaries,
office assistants–but does not include managers thereof. In the Banking industry this cell
includes a large number of bank tellers. In all industries the cell includes a large number of
secretaries.
C Construction of Matched CPS
We thank Donghoon Lee for providing us with his methodology. The "Matched CPS" takes
advantage of the fact that households in the CPS are sampled for more than a year, in the
following pattern. Each household that enters the survey at any given month is sampled for
four months, leaves for eight months, and then returns for four more months, after which it
exits. Therefore, theoretically, every household that is surveyed in March of any given year
must have been surveyed in the previous March, or will be surveyed in the next. Of course,
in practice not all individuals get surveyed twice due to survey attrition, non-compliance,
etc.’.
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Unfortunately, the CPS does not hold a definitive person ID, by which one could easily
match two observations on the same individual from two consecutive surveys. The following
methodology is used to match observations on the same individual from two consecutive
surveys. We match individual observations from two consecutive surveys by household ID,
their "line" within the household (which is an intra-household identifier), state of residence,
race, sex and year of birth. These are supplemented with a few more identifiers generated
by the CPS (segment number, serial number and a random cluster code). We make sure
that there are only two observations within each cell defined by these identifiers and drop
all other cells.
Some survey years cannot be matched. Survey year 1968 cannot be matched backwards,
because our sample starts with that survey year. Likewise, survey year 2006 cannot be
matched backwards, because our sample end with that survey year. Other survey years
that cannot be matched for technical reasons are 1971, 1972, 1976, 1985, 1995 and 2001.
Approximately 63% of all observations are actually matched from within survey years that
can be matched.
Definition of unemployment
Here we give the exact definition of our unemployment indicator. A person would get a
positive indication of unemployment if:
1. did not work last year and reported: could not find work, looking for work or on layoff.
2. in survey years 1968-1993 major activity in the week before the survey was looking
for work.
3. in survey years 1968-1993 did not work last week due to being laid-off.
4. in survey years 1994-2006 reported being on layoff or looking for work.
5. in survey years 1968-1988 reported reason for working part year was looking for work
or being unemployed.
6. reported positive number of weeks looking for work last year.
7. reported positive number of weeks being unemployed last year.
Since the sample for our transition regressions includes only people that were not unem-
ployed in the first year they were surveyed, this eventually reduces our sample. Table A
contains the number of observations in the transition regressions for every year that could
be matched.
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Year Matched observations Year Matched observations
1967 14,318 1986 17,441
1968 13,683 1987 16,568
1969 15,004 1988 17,555
1970 . 1989 19,146
1971 . 1990 18,393
1972 9,299 1991 17,634
1973 13,882 1992 13,497
1974 8,857 1993 12,704
1975 . 1994 .
1976 15,761 1995 17,461
1977 15,984 1996 17,794
1978 16,516 1997 17,639
1979 20,268 1998 17,979
1980 18,014 1999 18,406
1981 17,519 2000 .
1982 16,525 2001 25,253
1983 16,256 2002 25,390
1984 . 2003 22,162
1985 16,899 2004 23,498
TOTAL 547,305
Appendix Table A: Matched CPS Sample
Notes: This sample takes into account the number of successful matches in the 
CPS and the following restrictions. Individuals in the first matched year must be in 
the labor force, employed in the private sector; in the second matched year 
individuals just need to be in the labor force (not retired, in school full time, etc').
Banking Banks, thrifts and saving institutions
Insurance Insurance companies
Rest of Finance Investment banks, mutual and pension funds, private equity funds, brokers and dealers
Managers and professionals Bank officers, financial managers, economists, financial analysts, etc.
Computer and matchematics Computer scientists and engineers, systems analysts, programmers, database administrators and mathematicians 
Insurance specialists Insurance sales agents, actuaries and statisticians
Securities and financial asset sales Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents, and personal financial advisors
Administration Clerical jobs and bank tellers
Other Janitors, private security and miscelanous
Table 1: Classification of Tasks and Industries
Industries in Financial Sector
Occupations in Financial Sector
Non Financial 
Private Sector
Year Obs. Obs. Empl. Share Obs. Empl. Share Obs. Empl. Share
1967 56002 1046 0.0181 149 0.0026 1008 0.0173
1968 57229 1039 0.0176 197 0.0033 1001 0.0168
1969 55806 1118 0.0193 227 0.0040 1030 0.0179
1970 56644 1098 0.0188 196 0.0033 1140 0.0195
1971 54208 1049 0.0186 167 0.0030 1121 0.0198
1972 53218 1112 0.0201 190 0.0034 1048 0.0189
1973 53695 1105 0.0198 183 0.0033 1045 0.0187
1974 52654 1217 0.0220 142 0.0026 1056 0.0191
1975 53979 1154 0.0205 154 0.0028 1009 0.0181
1976 65773 1382 0.0203 179 0.0029 1124 0.0171
1977 64855 1394 0.0211 171 0.0028 1128 0.0178
1978 65574 1514 0.0221 185 0.0030 1216 0.0190
1979 77736 1812 0.0228 207 0.0030 1408 0.0185
1980 77096 1919 0.0249 237 0.0035 1452 0.0195
1981 68789 1749 0.0245 267 0.0041 1294 0.0189
1982 67709 1708 0.0244 276 0.0045 1250 0.0186
1983 67173 1732 0.0250 290 0.0045 1293 0.0196
1984 68834 1840 0.0256 361 0.0055 1253 0.0180
1985 67826 1780 0.0254 318 0.0047 1343 0.0193
1986 67575 1798 0.0254 357 0.0054 1275 0.0183
1987 67589 1955 0.0275 408 0.0057 1400 0.0201
1988 63617 1752 0.0266 350 0.0057 1314 0.0201
1989 69460 1923 0.0260 434 0.0062 1474 0.0205
1990 68970 1842 0.0249 344 0.0049 1491 0.0208
1991 68015 1820 0.0246 331 0.0050 1400 0.0204
1992 67035 1746 0.0247 377 0.0059 1286 0.0187
1993 64307 1714 0.0257 363 0.0059 1313 0.0201
1994 64488 1636 0.0239 444 0.0065 1272 0.0190
1995 57499 1357 0.0223 356 0.0062 1164 0.0200
1996 58939 1431 0.0226 369 0.0064 1099 0.0185
1997 58096 1466 0.0237 391 0.0066 1212 0.0204
1998 58670 1490 0.0238 426 0.0076 1178 0.0197
1999 60287 1523 0.0241 487 0.0083 1096 0.0176
2000 57956 1452 0.0235 468 0.0086 1087 0.0190
2001 95774 2436 0.0234 703 0.0078 1806 0.0184
2002 94455 2532 0.0249 812 0.0079 1803 0.0190
2003 92403 2490 0.0255 700 0.0077 1853 0.0198
2004 90753 2435 0.0254 706 0.0081 1816 0.0196
2005 90427 2396 0.0249 745 0.0087 1659 0.0173
Notes: Obs. is the number of observations in the March CPS of the following year (data for 2005 is collected in the CPS of March 2006). 
Employment share is the share in total private sector employment, in terms of full-time equivalents, computed using the CPS weight to obtain a 
representative sample.
Table 2: Number of Observations and Employment Shares, by Industry
InsuranceOther Finance IndustriesBanking
Occupation
year Obs. Empl. Share Obs. Empl. Share Obs. Empl. Share Obs. Empl. Share Obs. Empl. Share Obs. Empl. Share
1967 554 0.252 . . 278 0.127 12 0.006 1272 0.576 87 0.039
1968 534 0.238 . . 274 0.122 5 0.002 1363 0.609 61 0.028
1969 561 0.232 . . 230 0.095 15 0.006 1486 0.630 83 0.036
1970 527 0.217 27 0.011 362 0.147 66 0.026 1382 0.571 70 0.027
1971 483 0.206 25 0.011 334 0.141 59 0.025 1361 0.585 75 0.032
1972 513 0.217 18 0.008 335 0.142 65 0.027 1349 0.576 70 0.030
1973 544 0.232 30 0.013 318 0.136 74 0.032 1293 0.556 74 0.032
1974 540 0.224 29 0.012 331 0.138 50 0.020 1390 0.575 75 0.031
1975 539 0.235 29 0.012 288 0.126 48 0.020 1335 0.574 78 0.033
1976 662 0.242 20 0.009 316 0.117 52 0.021 1554 0.577 81 0.034
1977 680 0.253 32 0.012 324 0.119 63 0.026 1526 0.565 68 0.025
1978 722 0.242 35 0.013 316 0.109 64 0.024 1698 0.582 80 0.029
1979 800 0.235 48 0.015 349 0.101 67 0.023 2068 0.597 95 0.028
1980 919 0.248 38 0.012 388 0.106 90 0.028 2066 0.577 107 0.030
1981 794 0.243 54 0.017 346 0.104 123 0.041 1898 0.564 95 0.032
1982 860 0.271 51 0.017 306 0.090 116 0.040 1765 0.541 136 0.041
1983 971 0.297 65 0.021 289 0.086 117 0.034 1747 0.520 126 0.043
1984 976 0.287 60 0.017 273 0.078 161 0.050 1866 0.537 118 0.032
1985 986 0.283 60 0.016 310 0.090 141 0.042 1830 0.535 114 0.033
1986 998 0.296 65 0.020 286 0.080 160 0.048 1814 0.523 107 0.034
1987 1110 0.294 81 0.023 295 0.075 198 0.054 1950 0.519 129 0.035
1988 1126 0.328 76 0.024 281 0.082 167 0.051 1666 0.485 100 0.030
1989 1222 0.320 94 0.026 337 0.092 158 0.042 1897 0.487 123 0.033
1990 1157 0.309 90 0.026 304 0.085 157 0.045 1868 0.510 101 0.026
1991 1130 0.313 71 0.022 291 0.082 155 0.047 1778 0.501 126 0.035
1992 1147 0.339 84 0.026 287 0.087 150 0.049 1645 0.471 96 0.028
1993 1171 0.346 97 0.027 279 0.081 166 0.054 1578 0.460 99 0.032
1994 1170 0.342 107 0.031 261 0.080 192 0.059 1520 0.457 102 0.031
1995 995 0.344 81 0.029 264 0.094 171 0.061 1272 0.437 94 0.034
1996 1034 0.358 87 0.032 240 0.087 188 0.068 1273 0.431 77 0.025
1997 1105 0.363 83 0.027 261 0.083 188 0.064 1339 0.435 93 0.028
1998 1200 0.398 95 0.032 243 0.076 198 0.068 1263 0.398 95 0.028
1999 1166 0.377 103 0.035 218 0.067 229 0.075 1289 0.413 101 0.033
2000 1100 0.368 106 0.040 252 0.087 210 0.076 1237 0.396 102 0.033
2001 1885 0.388 157 0.030 347 0.076 358 0.078 2036 0.396 162 0.032
2002 2162 0.417 227 0.045 341 0.079 400 0.077 1830 0.347 187 0.035
2003 2098 0.410 270 0.055 363 0.072 393 0.084 1790 0.353 129 0.027
2004 2065 0.408 297 0.058 322 0.069 401 0.088 1729 0.350 143 0.027
2005 2081 0.431 247 0.049 282 0.057 394 0.090 1660 0.343 136 0.030
Notes: Obs. is the number of observations in the March CPS of the following year (data for 2005 is collected in the CPS of March 2006). Employment share is the share of employment in Finance and Insurance, in terms of 
full-time equivalents, computed using the CPS weight to obtain representative sample.
Table 3: Number of Observations and Employment Shares, by Occupation
Managers & Professionals Computer & Mathematics OthersAdministration and ClerksSecurities and Asset SalesInsurance Specialists
Sample 1967-1970 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 2001-2005
Finance 0.03488 0.0331 0.04335 0.0664 0.12681 0.14797 0.17433 0.19897
[0.00489] [0.00468] [0.00404] [0.00406] [0.00416] [0.00442] [0.00472] [0.00378]
White 0.2011 0.15176 0.10651 0.11517 0.10216 0.08509 0.06909 0.07165
[0.00371] [0.00354] [0.00295] [0.00300] [0.00304] [0.00305] [0.00316] [0.00232]
Male 0.45759 0.4609 0.45297 0.40061 0.36272 0.31803 0.31979 0.31526
[0.00245] [0.00231] [0.00191] [0.00197] [0.00203] [0.00210] [0.00220] [0.00180]
Married 0.08004 0.08278 0.07528 0.06951 0.0844 0.09803 0.10024 0.11465
[0.00275] [0.00257] [0.00209] [0.00214] [0.00218] [0.00226] [0.00236] [0.00196]
Urban 0.02579 0.01872 0.01531 0.01601 0.02032 0.01204 0.00482 0.00167
[0.00227] [0.00225] [0.00210] [0.00222] [0.00235] [0.00248] [0.00256] [0.00214]
Potential Experience 0.02751 0.03475 0.03525 0.03612 0.03674 0.03551 0.03148 0.03207
[0.00030] [0.00029] [0.00026] [0.00029] [0.00030] [0.00031] [0.00032] [0.00027]
(Potential Experience)2 -0.00047 -0.0006 -0.00058 -0.00058 -0.00058 -0.00054 -0.00048 -0.00051
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001]
Edu = 12 Years 0.1879 0.19456 0.22173 0.24228 0.24929 0.27398 0.29507 0.28956
[0.00252] [0.00263] [0.00248] [0.00287] [0.00318] [0.00378] [0.00399] [0.00343]
13 ≤ Edu ≤ 15 Years 0.32265 0.33139 0.35047 0.39876 0.43382 0.46178 0.48386 0.48714
[0.00349] [0.00340] [0.00297] [0.00330] [0.00355] [0.00392] [0.00409] [0.00348]
16 ≤ Edu ≤ 17 Years 0.54919 0.55736 0.5582 0.62896 0.70424 0.77204 0.80378 0.81657
[0.00367] [0.00355] [0.00313] [0.00340] [0.00366] [0.00417] [0.00432] [0.00364]
Edu ≥ 18 Years 0.66503 0.69095 0.73268 0.81891 0.90028 1.02087 1.07548 1.10141
[0.00554] [0.00502] [0.00414] [0.00422] [0.00442] [0.00474] [0.00495] [0.00408]
Obs 130608 157919 226316 227449 242399 233500 223906 358991
R2 0.41 0.41 0.4 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35
Table 4: Relative Wages in the Financial Sector, Controlling for Education
Notes: Dependent variable is log of annual wage earnings. The sample includes only full-time-full-year workers (at least 40 week per year, at least 35 hours per week on average). Finance is a dummy for the financial sector. Married is a 
dummy variable for individuals who are married and not separated. Urban is a dummy variable for individuals who live in an MSA (Census metropolitan statistical area) in a central city (until 2003) or in a principal city (after 2004). 
Potential Experience is calculated as min{age-years of school-6 , age-18}. The control group for education consists of individuals with 11 years of schooling or less. Edu = 12 Years is a dummy variable for individuals who have exactly 12 
years of education. 13 ≤ Edu ≤ 15 Years is a dummy variable for individuals who have between 13 and 15 years of education, and so on. Each column reports the estimates over a 5-year period (the first column has only 4 years). All 
regressions include intra-period year dummies, which are not reported. Standard errors in brackets. Data: March CPS.
Sample 1967-1970 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 2001-2005
Edu = 12 Years 0.18853 0.1955 0.22368 0.24424 0.25149 0.27573 0.29691 0.2906
[0.00256] [0.00266] [0.00251] [0.00290] [0.00322] [0.00384] [0.00405] [0.00349]
13 ≤ Edu ≤ 15 Years 0.32546 0.33374 0.35388 0.40447 0.43916 0.46631 0.48917 0.49213
[0.00358] [0.00348] [0.00303] [0.00337] [0.00361] [0.00398] [0.00416] [0.00355]
Edu ≥ 16 Years 0.58276 0.59595 0.60807 0.68784 0.76601 0.85787 0.8948 0.91506
[0.00338] [0.00330] [0.00292] [0.00321] [0.00348] [0.00399] [0.00415] [0.00353]
Edu = 12 in Finance -0.04836 -0.0547 -0.0801 -0.1155 -0.12357 -0.13635 -0.18547 -0.16013
[0.01688] [0.01985] [0.02145] [0.02489] [0.02927] [0.04261] [0.04400] [0.03634]
Edu 13 to 15 in Finance -0.07921 -0.07406 -0.09739 -0.16074 -0.15938 -0.16379 -0.225 -0.21525
[0.01883] [0.02113] [0.02222] [0.02543] [0.02968] [0.04262] [0.04386] [0.03615]
Edu ≥ 16 in Finance -0.10067 -0.07981 -0.0334 -0.0934 -0.09439 -0.11884 -0.1677 -0.15747
[0.01910] [0.02103] [0.02215] [0.02523] [0.02943] [0.04252] [0.04373] [0.03600]
Finance 0.09271 0.09114 0.10731 0.17751 0.24032 0.27375 0.34998 0.35888
[0.01546] [0.01869] [0.02064] [0.02411] [0.02853] [0.04188] [0.04307] [0.03552]
White 0.20103 0.15202 0.10718 0.11644 0.10307 0.08652 0.06985 0.07189
[0.00371] [0.00355] [0.00296] [0.00302] [0.00305] [0.00307] [0.00319] [0.00234]
Male 0.45996 0.46358 0.45488 0.40291 0.36464 0.31975 0.32069 0.31596
[0.00246] [0.00232] [0.00192] [0.00198] [0.00204] [0.00213] [0.00223] [0.00183]
Married 0.07973 0.0826 0.07515 0.07027 0.08514 0.10018 0.10339 0.1186
[0.00276] [0.00257] [0.00210] [0.00214] [0.00219] [0.00228] [0.00238] [0.00198]
Urban 0.02597 0.01932 0.0162 0.01708 0.02207 0.01459 0.00838 0.0052
[0.00228] [0.00225] [0.00211] [0.00223] [0.00236] [0.00250] [0.00258] [0.00216]
Potential Experience 0.0277 0.035 0.03568 0.03683 0.03759 0.0368 0.03252 0.03288
[0.00030] [0.00029] [0.00026] [0.00029] [0.00030] [0.00031] [0.00033] [0.00027]
(Potential Experience)2 -0.00048 -0.0006 -0.00059 -0.00059 -0.00059 -0.00057 -0.0005 -0.00052
[0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001]
Obs 130608 157919 226316 227449 242399 233500 223906 358991
R2 0.41 0.4 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34
Table 5: Relative Wages in the Financial Sector, within Education Groups.
Notes: Dependent variable is log of annual wage earnings. The sample includes only full-time-full-year workers (at least 40 week per year, at least 35 hours per week on average). Finance is a dummy for the financial sector. Married is a 
dummy variable for individuals who are married and not separated. Urban is a dummy variable for individuals who live in an MSA (Census metropolitan statistical area) in a central city (until 2003) or in a principal city (after 2004). Potential 
Experience is calculated as min{age-years of school-6 , age-18}. The control group for education consists of individuals with 11 years of schooling or less. Edu = 12 Years is a dummy variable for individuals who have exactly 12 years of 
education. 13 ≤ Edu ≤ 15 Years is a dummy variable for individuals who have between 13 and 15 years of education, and so on. “Edu… in Finance” are dummies that take the value one for individuals who have the same educational 
attainment as above, but who also work in the Finance and Insurance sector. Each column reports the estimates over a 5-year period (the first column has only 4 years). All regressions include intra-period year dummies, which are not 
reported. Standard errors in brackets. Data: March CPS.
Sample 1967-1970 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 2001-2005
Finance -0.55163 -0.48595 -0.51157 -0.39715 -0.22957 -0.09342 -0.19605 -0.13666
[0.12997] [0.12223] [0.07282] [0.07669] [0.06556] [0.08058] [0.08940] [0.07263]
Full Time -0.6888 -0.64956 -0.6678 -0.6518 -0.71851 -0.72143 -0.73918 -0.75474
[0.04573] [0.04682] [0.02845] [0.03383] [0.03106] [0.04054] [0.04194] [0.03700]
White -0.24414 -0.26895 -0.27827 -0.25777 -0.24927 -0.11512 -0.23705 -0.22088
[0.06493] [0.06572] [0.03952] [0.04450] [0.04011] [0.05084] [0.05044] [0.04001]
Male 0.13284 0.09335 0.12484 0.26709 0.17983 0.20923 0.18362 0.25813
[0.04322] [0.04265] [0.02592] [0.02935] [0.02695] [0.03431] [0.03553] [0.02994]
Married -0.28398 -0.15524 -0.26885 -0.20554 -0.22744 -0.30026 -0.41706 -0.41784
[0.04705] [0.04754] [0.02832] [0.03198] [0.02939] [0.03695] [0.03797] [0.03198]
Urban 0.05337 0.03043 0.02159 0.06543 0.0692 0.10191 0.0425 0.0438
[0.04457] [0.04612] [0.03039] [0.03445] [0.03282] [0.04120] [0.04222] [0.03635]
Potential Experience -0.01853 -0.02353 -0.02637 -0.02288 -0.01941 -0.0192 -0.01406 -0.01132
[0.00157] [0.00161] [0.00103] [0.00118] [0.00112] [0.00144] [0.00147] [0.00125]
Edu = 12 Years -0.3306 -0.32743 -0.28063 -0.2161 -0.23232 -0.21526 -0.19161 -0.13053
[0.04565] [0.04790] [0.03064] [0.03648] [0.03552] [0.05014] [0.05219] [0.04630]
13 ≤ Edu ≤ 15 Years -0.51242 -0.45212 -0.48243 -0.53541 -0.49445 -0.44932 -0.35927 -0.28709
[0.06535] [0.06228] [0.03793] [0.04415] [0.04126] [0.05229] [0.05351] [0.04684]
16 ≤ Edu ≤ 17 Years -1.39368 -1.07073 -0.93185 -1.02105 -0.85484 -0.8367 -0.72462 -0.63434
[0.10816] [0.08563] [0.04866] [0.05451] [0.04919] [0.06437] [0.06470] [0.05513]
Edu ≥ 18 Years -1.28817 -1.61834 -1.56246 -1.57639 -1.14617 -1.12689 -1.1033 -0.98919
[0.17475] [0.17126] [0.09090] [0.09203] [0.07164] [0.08757] [0.09209] [0.07332]
Obs 43005 32038 86543 67199 89103 61296 71818 96303
Table 6: Unemployment Risk
Notes: Logit regressions for individuals employed in the private sector at time t. Dependent variable is 1 if individual is unemployed at time t+1 (see appendix for exact definition of unemployed) and zero otherwise. Finance is a dummy 
variable for the financial sector. Married is a dummy variable for individuals who are married and not separated. Urban is a dummy variable for individuals who live in an MSA (Census metropolitan statistical area) in a central city (until 
2003) or in a principal city (after 2004). Potential Experience is calculated as min{age-years of school-6 , age-18}. The control group for education consists of individuals with 11 years of schooling or less. Edu = 12 Years is a dummy 
variable for individuals who have exactly 12 years of education. 13 ≤ Edu ≤ 15 Years is a dummy variable for individuals who have between 13 and 15 years of education, and so on. Each column reports the estimates over a 5-year perio
(the first column has only 4 years). All regressions include intra-period year dummies, which are not reported. Standard errors in brackets. Data: March CPS.
Sample 1967-1970 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 2001-2005
Bottom Third in Finance -0.58205 -0.60036 -0.41412 -0.44401 -0.2858 -0.14351 -0.41276 -0.22189
[0.18298] [0.18757] [0.10070] [0.11799] [0.10623] [0.13066] [0.16468] [0.13544]
Middle Third in Finance -0.59635 -0.47248 -0.56554 -0.36725 -0.20259 -0.17626 0.03301 0.00476
[0.22593] [0.19836] [0.12501] [0.12536] [0.10422] [0.13548] [0.13380] [0.11694]
Top Third in Finance -0.78108 -0.63339 -0.95786 -0.55203 -0.28899 0.09347 -0.26708 -0.14711
[0.30781] [0.26623] [0.19315] [0.16383] [0.13484] [0.15288] [0.17358] [0.12580]
Middle Third -0.23101 -0.27866 -0.37775 -0.40952 -0.32161 -0.45454 -0.33456 -0.36635
[0.05508] [0.05584] [0.03366] [0.03771] [0.03423] [0.04278] [0.04464] [0.03748]
Top Third -0.74294 -0.71106 -0.78857 -0.75884 -0.79157 -0.94773 -0.74116 -0.68784
[0.06744] [0.06835] [0.04078] [0.04364] [0.04084] [0.05206] [0.05249] [0.04305]
Full Time -0.58853 -0.55453 -0.52187 -0.4902 -0.57371 -0.52462 -0.59959 -0.61395
[0.04989] [0.05143] [0.03085] [0.03617] [0.03294] [0.04212] [0.04350] [0.03789]
White -0.24765 -0.2891 -0.28991 -0.25684 -0.24805 -0.09657 -0.22218 -0.19959
[0.06480] [0.06529] [0.03939] [0.04430] [0.04000] [0.05083] [0.05036] [0.03997]
Male 0.37533 0.31184 0.35865 0.46078 0.3633 0.39333 0.33302 0.40178
[0.04565] [0.04539] [0.02755] [0.03083] [0.02786] [0.03515] [0.03622] [0.03057]
Married -0.24677 -0.16369 -0.25301 -0.20331 -0.22019 -0.26551 -0.40752 -0.41649
[0.04746] [0.04747] [0.02840] [0.03197] [0.02933] [0.03707] [0.03796] [0.03193]
Urban 0.04582 0.00895 0.01026 0.04839 0.0555 0.08867 0.02174 0.02524
[0.04448] [0.04592] [0.03029] [0.03428] [0.03271] [0.04113] [0.04210] [0.03627]
Potential Experience -0.01259 -0.01644 -0.0197 -0.01569 -0.01427 -0.01376 -0.01079 -0.00824
[0.00150] [0.00153] [0.00099] [0.00114] [0.00109] [0.00139] [0.00143] [0.00122]
Obs 43005 32038 86543 67199 89103 61296 71818 96303
Table 7: Unemployment Risk, Controlling for Current Wage
Notes: Logit regressions for individuals employed in the private sector at time t. Dependent variable is 1 if individual is unemployed at time t+1 (see appendix for exact definition of unemployed) and zero otherwise. Three dummies 
characterizing the position of the individual in the overall wage distribution (bottom, median and top third) are interacted with a dummy for the financial sector. The control group for education consists of individuals in the bottom third of the 
wage distribution and who work outside the financial sector. Married is a dummy variable for individuals who are married and not separated. Urban is a dummy variable for individuals who live in an MSA (Census metropolitan statistical 
area) in a central city (until 2003) or in a principal city (after 2004). Potential Experience is calculated as min{age-years of school-6 , age-18}. Each column reports the estimates over a 5-year period (the first column has only 4 years). All 
regressions include intra-period year dummies, which are not reported. Standard errors in brackets. Data: March CPS.
Figure 1: The Growth of the Financial Sector
Notes: Finance includes Insurance but excludes Real Estate. Value added share is the nominal value added of the financial sector divided by the nominal GDP of the U.S. 
Employment includes full-time and part-time employees. Data: Annual Industrial Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Notes: Share of Private Hours Worked is the number of hours worked in the sector divided by the total number of hours worked in the entire private sector. Share of Private 
Labor Income is the sum of annual wages paid to employees of the financial sector divided by the sum of annual wages in the entire private sector. Hours and wages are 
weighted using sampling weights. Data: March CPS.
Figure 2: Evolution of Industries
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Figure 3: Relative Wages and Education in Financial Sector
Notes: Relative Wage is the percentage difference in average hourly wages between employees in the financial sector and employees in the rest of the (private) economy. 
Relative Education is the share of hours worked in the financial sector accounted for by employees with at least a college degree, minus the corresponding share in the rest of 
the private sector. Data: March CPS.
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Figure 4: College Graduates and Education Intensity
Notes: Share of Hours Worked by College Graduates is the share of hours worked in the sector accounted for by employees with at least a college degree. Relative 
Normalized Education Intensity is the ratio of high skilled hours over low skilled hours in the particular sector, divided by the same ratio in the rest of the private sector. The 
measure is normalized so that it has a mean of one over the first five years of the sample. Hours and wages are weighted using sampling weights. Data: March CPS.
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Figure 5: Hour-Shares of Occupations in the Financial Sector
Notes: Hours worked by employees in a given occupation divided by total hours worked in the financial sector. Hours and wages are weighted using sampling weights. Data: 
March CPS.
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Notes: All wages are in 2001 U.S. dollars and are weighted using sampling weights. Data: March CPS.
Figure 6: Annual Income of Engineers and Financiers
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Notes: Coefficient of Finance dummy and 95% confidence intervals from regressions of log annual wages over individual characteristics. Basic controls include race, sex, 
marital status, urban residence, potential experience and its square. Education controls are dummies for education groups: 12 years of education, 13 to 15 years, 16 to 17 
years, and 18 years or more. Data: March CPS.
Figure 7: Finance Wage Premium, with and without Education Controls
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Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for sector dummies in regression of log annual wages over individual characteristics. Controls include race, sex, marital 
status, urban residence, potential experience and its square. Education controls are dummies for education groups: 12 years of education, 13 to 15 years, 16 to 17 years, and 
18 years or more. Data: March CPS.
Figure 8: Wage Premia in Finance Industries, Controlling for Education
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Banking Insurance Other Finance Industries
Notes: Coefficients of dummies interacted with education, from regressions of annual log wage on individual characteristics, Controls include race, sex, marital status, urban 
residence, potential experience and its square. Data: March CPS.
Figure 9: Wage Premia in Finance, by Education Groups
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Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of Finance dummy in logit regression of transition from Employment to Unemployment. Controls include current log wage, 
race, sex, marital status, urban residence, potential experience and its square. Education controls are dummies for education groups: 12 years of education, 13 to 15 years, 
16 to 17 years, and 18 years or more. Data: March CPS.
Figure 10: Relative Unemployment Risk in Financial Sector
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Notes: Coefficients for position in the wage distribution in logit regression of transition from employment to unemployment. Controls include current log wage, race, sex, 
marital status, urban residence, potential experience and its square, as well as the position of the individual in the current income distribution: bottom third, middle third or 
top third. Data: March CPS.
Figure 11: Relative Unemployment Risk in Financial Sector, sorted by Current Wage
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